Why does the theist have the burden of proof

And yes, you do have some serious misunderstandings about what you are attempting to comment on. If you need help, then ask. But you are not doing either of those. Another example of the misunderstanding I mentioned above is your response to my comment that conceivability is not necessarily a guide to logical possibility. In that response, you deny that you ever said such a thing, assume that I am confused about conceivability, and then claim it is synonymous with possibility!

How you missed that this was exactly my problem with what you said I do not know, but repeating yourself does not really help. Instead of assuming I am confused and waving your hand, try thinking through the things I write. Unfortunately it was not. Second, there still appear to be differences between the attempted syllogistic argument and the portion of the post John quotes. Third, for whatever reason, John still thinks that the post pertains to the alleged immunity of God from atheist critique see what is quoted from me above , but that is not the argument.

It is neither again, see my point quoted above. The conclusions are vastly different. I would suggest rereading the post and my initial response to your concerns. Also, if your comments take a little while to appear, do not be alarmed. I have been very busy, and the guys generally do not approve comments for others. In response to the comment from Steven S. There are those who would disagree, but setting their arguments aside, what evidence do you have for thinking that there is a material world?

Or at any rate it has in your past experience, which is no guarantee that it will continue to do so in your future experience, but that aside, I do not see how this equates to evidence or knowledge that the material world exists anymore than the previous observation.

I was asking about the material world, but if you want to conflate the two that is fine, just note that it may not be beneficial to do so. But why think that? I could care less about philosophical certainty. I am wondering why one should think a material world exists.

I have my own answers to this question of course, but I am interested in yours. I fully understand that you are not trying to disprove the existence of God, however you are mistaken to think that you are arguing against a specific set of proofs for the existence of God if you are referring to your comments on this post, since this post does not present any arguments for the existence of God, but rather for the atheists burden of proof. These appearances come from sense-data.

See above regarding the alternatives to the material world. Then you have above my answers. They are sufficient, at least to me, well within any bounds of sufficient certainty. This set of comments has rather diverged, if not before than most definitively with your question regarding the material world, from its beginning.

If you give me the references in Dewey and James I will likewise dig them out. Now you take it that 1 you are making up these sense-data, 2 some outside entity is imputing all these sense-data this need not be a personal agent , or 3 there is a material world.

Insofar as you base the entirety of your knowledge upon your alleged knowledge of the material world as I believe you either stated or alluded to earlier, you thus far have displayed a rather arbitrary basis for said knowledge. Am I pressing solipsism? Methodological solipsism, yes, though not on my part, but according to your apparent view. I realize that you may claim these as regards past experience, but I do not know upon what basis you claim them with respect to any future experience.

The comments have gone off topic, however, you will note that I have pressed you concerning your claims, whether explicit or implicit, to knowledge, and you have been attempting to answer my questions. I addressed this towards the end of my comment. I find it far from arbitrary; it is about as basic as it is possible for me, as a person, to get. While I may have come by more fundamental logical principles, it was only through the information I received through the senses say, for example, reading.

It is possible that I am being deliberately misled by some Great Outside Entity. Given that fact, there is no reason for me to hold either of those views — indeed, holding either view is tantamount to denying what the world is telling me, in the sensory inputs I receive, and undercuts my ability to believe anything else.

Obviously, future breaths I have not taken cannot yet serve that purpose; but when I have run an experiment N times, where N is sufficiently large, the odds that, barring some clear outside factor e. Indeed, 1 is perhaps the most parsimonious of them all! You multiply entities beyond necessity in 3, making new assumptions about material existence when you need not do so to explain your experience. Now it is unfortunate you mention coming upon fundamental logical principles through the senses, because I still doubt that you have shown there is any good reason for holding that a material world exists, much less that your senses are reliable!

You appear to be assuming that nature exhibits some sort of regularity such that we can extrapolate based upon the present testimony of our senses what will probably be the case, and I do not know why you would do so. Indeed true — I misspoke. In the sense that it requires something other than me to exist, you have a point. On the other hand, it also makes no difference in terms of what I do, or how I act, since the simulacrum in which I exist is so perfect.

I never claimed that my senses were perfectly reliable. Citing explanatory power is a strange way to attempt to refute a view. You may claim that 1, 2, or 3 make no difference in terms of what you do, but there is a relevant difference in that my point of contention regards your earlier claim to know 3 as opposed to 1 or 2.

You have not demonstrated any such knowledge, and to make things worse you claim that the remainder of your knowledge is based upon 3. Nowhere did I ask anything concerning the perfect reliability of your senses. Rather, I inquired as to their reliability. I granted your qualification concerning sample size already.

It is not relevant to my inquiry concerning your previous claim. What relevance does that have beyond the present testimony of the senses? None that I can see. However, I have called these alleged principles into question within the context of your understanding of them. So yes, I do hold that everyone knows God. On the contrary. You can look in the thread on the recent debate for my thoughts on induction into the future from the past. Validity applies to deduction, not induction.

This is not to say that I reject induction, it is simply to recognize induction for what it is; a non-deductive method.

I do not reject induction. I am asking you about your reasoning behind accepting inductive reasoning in the manner you have. What is that, if not dismissing the validity of inductive reasoning? It was a question as to your reasoning behind the claims you are making. That does not mean that I reject inductive reasoning. That means that I am asking you about your reason for accepting it.

There is a very big difference between the two. As for my ignorance, yes, I confess you have given me no knowledge regarding why you accept induction on your view. It does appear you are accepting the inductive principle uncritically and arbitrarily. You have not given me any reason to think otherwise, anyway. I read your previous comment quite closely, and went back and reread it.

I read through your comments on the other thread, and it is clear that you do not actually understand the problem of induction. So, I apologize that I may be moving too quickly. If you review your pragmatists you will see that they generally concede to the problem, and move on in a different way. And I have told you. It has worked for me in the past, and it provides a method for me to correct my understanding into the future.

It allows for the accretion of new knowledge and new understanding. I confess you have given me no knowledge regarding why you accept induction on your view. I have given you several explanations — well, oftne the same explanation, several times. Therefore, a solipsistic worldview is unfalsifiable.

Are you familiar with the Omphalos hypothesis of Philip Gosse? If not, I recommend looking it up, as it will be rather informative on this point, and some of the others I raise above. Actually, I understand the formal problem of philosophical induction; I am not, however, prepared to abandon the field to purely deductive means of reasoning that invoke external entities to attempt to justify their own inductions, as that is, quite simply, cheating.

You really should update your philosophy. David Hume addressed why this response does not work a long time ago. Even assuming that your memory is correct in this instance, you have not provided anything whereby we may move on from the memory.

You forgot your line of argumentation with respect to 1, 2, and 3 and I pointed that out. Now, you write that in a solipsistic world, anything is explicable, and there is no requirement of consistency, non-contradictions, etc. Indeed, many have suggested as much with respect to 3. So here you go: just as I am agnostic about the existence of a god, I am also agnostic toward to the question of whether these activities are possible in a godless world.

I certainly do not claim that it is definitely possible. Agnosticism with respect to the possibility of those activities apart from God is logically equivalent to thinking that it is possible to carry out those activities apart from God. I very clearly conceded that it may be completely impossible. So yes, agnosticism with respect to the existence of God or allegedly corresponding truths concerning epistemic success amounts to possibility claims with respect to His existence and allegedly corresponding truths concerning epistemic success.

You are not neutral. To even say so is to disagree with what Scripture and hence God says about you, and you are back to defending a positive position like the strong atheist. Okay, fine. The proposition is understandable enough.

Now, just as in the case above, P is possibly true or possibly false. Now putting this into words explicitly: A. This is the distinction you need to understand to prevent self-contradiction. So back to what I said in the initial post, I am agnostic to the correct choice between the following two possibilities:. The former is on an entirely different level than the latter, and only the latter is relevant to the content of this article. I do not claim that X is possible, so please understand that before responding.

First, in the larger context of Christian doctrine, and second, in the context of Presuppositional literature, and third, in the context of our own body of work. While you are earnestly asking us to consider your responses, please do us the courtesy of returning the favor.

Further, Chris explained what he meant in later exchange. Whether you recognized the reference is something else, again. Let me give you the context for why he says the above. Elsewhere on this site , you can find this quote by Van Til:.

If I assert that there is a black cat in the closet, and you assert that nobody knows what is in the closet, you have virtually told me that I am wrong in my hypothesis.

So when I tell Mr. He is obviously thinking of such a god as could comfortably live in the realm of chance. But the God of Scripture cannot live in the realm of chance. However, there are a couple points to make from it.

Yes, we understand that you are not explicitly making this universal negative assertion that nobody can know — in this case, what is possible. You claim to be agnostic to it. However, there is a problem with that. Christianity says that only selection 1 is possibly true. Further, there is a denial of CT in that whether or not you claim to know whether 1 or 2 is true, CT claims that you do know; so agnosticism itself is a denial of CT.

This is what Chris was trying to tell you. This is not a contradiction — it is a doctrinal statement with logical consequences; namely, that by claiming agnosticism, you are actually making a positive claim which denies CT.

This has also been discussed previously on the site, and in debates complete with their surrounding discussions listed above. There is a paper in our last journal outlining the scriptural case that all men do, in fact, know God, and are morally without excuse in suppressing that truth in unrighteousness. So there is that further context.

There is a great amount of discussion by Van Til of this particular subject as well. Also, Christianity as I understand it says that it is impossible for Christianity as I understand it to be false.

Since this is the case, there is a logical equivalency to saying X is possible, due to the denial of 1, by granting possibility to 2. In short, by granting possibility to 2, you deny the possibility of 1, and grant that X is possible in reality, since to grant possibility to 2 is to deny the possibility of 1.

By saying that 2 might be possible, you say that 1 is impossible, and 2 is possible. Plus, just as a bonus; 1 claims that God determines possibility. By granting that 2 might be possible, you again deny the possibility of 1 by doing so, on those grounds.

Clear as mud? If I understand your response to others comments you agree that the burden of proof is on the party making the positive assertion. The way I understand it, 1 is a positive assertion by argument presenter that would have burden of proof, but you seem to say is not important to the argument. I simply do not see any evidence of the claims made in point one or two. The argument is about the burden all people have when entering into these discussions. Please take the time to read the post with more care.

What I was saying is that both the atheist and Christian have a burden of proof. The Christian by virtue of their explicit claim God exists. The introduction of the Biblical God into the picture is simply one illustration of how to point out the fact that these presuppositions cannot simply be taken for granted.

The Biblical Christian is not going to simply give this ground to the atheist and argue from there. Instead, they will point out the fact that the mere act of arguing against God presupposes that God exists. You have not done so, and cannot do so. Until you do, expect us to snicker under our collective breath at you, you silly things. The burden of proof lies on YOU. Regardless, first realize that we gladly accept the burden of proof. Second, realize that the author never claimed otherwise, but rather stated that the atheist also has a burden of proof.

The burden of proof lies on BOTH sides of the debate. In the fifth paragraph, the author makes several bold claims related to the delusion that his god exists. Its alleged qualities and characteristics are either self or mutually contradictory.

Regarding the authors silly presuppositions, also found in his fifth paragaraph, all that sort of clap-trap has been thoroughly debunked and refuted. See Michael Martins debate with Butler and Zens. As for burdens of proof, since there is no reason to think any god actually exists and plentiful reasons to think supernaturalism nothing more than silly imaginings of delusional people, then clearly any burden falls on those making positive claims.

Since there can be no evidence of the Abrahamic deity, such burden cannot, in principle, be hoisted. Nicely done. Oliphint, Frame, Butler, Knapp, myself, and others have addressed TANG at length, and Tremblay merely parrots the concerns expressed by Martin while evidencing a fair amount of misunderstanding with respect to Van Til and Plantinga.

Although the rather thorough spanking delivered unto you by Dawson Bethrick on his Incinerating Presuppositionalism blog will amply demonstrate the vacuity of your thinking for interested readers. You are also either clueless about what ad hoc, special pleading, and question begging actually mean, or else your delusion and psychosis have rendered you incapable or unwilling to even care about the meanings of words and fallacies.

Sadly, I have no time to correct the misinformation you are throwing around. Unfortunately for Dawson, writing a whole lot does not a sound argument make. If [the burden of proof] was given solely to one party, then only one party would have representation. And if only one party had representation, that representation must be true because the adversary has no [not minimal, but none] representation.

Only concession. In turn absolving the initial argument of, whom the burden of proof lies with. Thank you for enlightening us with a definition from an online legal dictionary. That is not what we are talking about. Not the proof itself. But neither can be considered the foundation of the argument, unless the argument is changed. Which is what has happened, the argument has changed to become the foundation of that argument. And by the condescending comment, I must conclude; the law [and anything online] is obsolete as a definition.

So we must have an empicial one, which again has not been established or agreed upon by any party. It is an agent of the founding stance and a mechanism used to challenge that founding stance. If an Athiest cannot or will not submit to a burden of proof, than the founding stance has no agent or mechanism for representation and must stand alone. And should be neutral in stance.

But because it is without definition. In relation to an argument, both are seperate and yet they occur because of their relationship to each other. They know what they are talking about and that opinion and position is conclusive to them. Also to un-demonize the words burden of proof by establishing them not as an argument to themselves but a rather a simple piece of a larger argument as both a position and concept by definition. Her opinion and position are conclusive.

His opinion and position is conclusive. He shows eveyone the Queen of Hearts and then places it back within his deck of three cards. After shuffling his deck of cards he places three cards on the table and says. Which will bring me back to the original discussion, where i must assume was not about the colour of cherries on Thurdays after 4pm, but rather the question of God or no God? Atheists will try explain away God by showing how belief in God originates — but this commits the genetic fallacy.

Atheists often try explain away God by claiming God is merely an explanation to fill in Gaps in our knowledge — but this is simply an avoidance of the evidence which makes no attempt to posit God as some mechanistic agent. Moreover, unless the atheist can show that the inference of God is not true, then they cannot claim it to be false, and therefore cannot claim God to merely be a Gap filler.

In summary — it is the one who makes a truth or positive claim that shoulders the burden of proof. If one rejects theism, and claims God does not exist, or claims God does not exist due to alleged lack of evidence — such an atheist not only shoulders the burden of proof — but also is guilty of an argument from ignorance. Like Like. I too would not affirm something if I did not see sufficient evidence. Be careful, however, for if you claim God does not exist — then you by definition shoulder a burden of proof.

Your last claim is a little telling, however, of a lack of serious inquiry into the tradition of theistic literature and Philosophy. Why not take the opposite tack of Scriven here?

We could add that if both the atheist and the agnostic hold that evidence for God is lacking, how does Scriven distinguish between these two positions?

According to his proposal, agnosticism would turn out to be identical to atheism. However, such a confusion of categories does not exist if we take the standard understanding of atheism as disbelief in God—not simply unbelief , which would properly describe the agnostic.

Of course, an agnostic might—and typically does—say that some evidence for God does exist, but that the some, roughly equally weighty evidence against God prevents her from belief in God. But this is beside the point here.

Third, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. As I noted earlier, if evidence for God is lacking, the more logical conclusion to draw would be agnosticism. After all, it is possible that God exists even if evidence for God were nowhere to be found. In this case, we should suspend belief, which would amount to mere un belief, but, as we have seen, that is different from dis belief i. Why think we are obligated to disbelieve? Some Christian philosophers like Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff have argued that we commonly believe many things without evidence or arguments—for example, that other minds exist or that the universe is older than fifteen minutes.

Now, we could claim that belief in other minds or a universe older than fifteen minutes is just part of our commonsense, everyday experience and thus is itself evidence. So such basic experiences serve as evidence, even if this evidence has not been produced through rock-solid formal arguments. But if these Reformed epistemologists are correct, then we can speak of a warranted belief in God without argument or evidence.

Fifth, to claim God and Santa Claus are on the same level is a flawed comparison. We have strong evidence that Santa Claus does not exist. We know where Christmas gifts come from.

We know that humans—let alone, elves—do not live at the North Pole. We can be pretty confident that a human Santa, if he existed, would be mortal rather than ageless and undying. This is evidence against Santa. The evidence for God is on a different level altogether.

In light of these points, we should bring in another important distinction. Notice that the militant agnostic is also making a knowledge claim. While this brand of agnostic may not know God exists, why insist that no one else can know?

What if God reveals himself in a powerful, though private, way to someone—say, at a burning bush or in a vision in her bedroom?

What is more, the biblical faith—unlike other traditional religions—is checkable; it opens itself up to public scrutiny. If, for example, Christ has not been raised from the dead, the Christian faith would be false, Paul argues in 1 Corinthians Indeed, the Scriptures routinely emphasize the role of eyewitnesses, the importance of public signs and wonders to prompt belief Jn.

While we can have rational reasons for belief in God, let us not forget ample practical or existential reasons for considering God. He continues to consult on cold-case investigations while serving as a Senior Fellow at the Colson Center for Christian Worldview.

He is also an Adj. Cold Case Christianity. Anchor Apologetics — Best Answers in Christianity. Your email address will not be published. Is there any good reason to believe we are more than merely physical beings? How might we investigate our material How can we interact with people who have already decided Christianity is false?

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